South Africa after Julius Malema
By James N Kariuki
Julius Malema
has finally been expelled from the ANC. In practical terms, this means that he
has been pushed from the glamour of public visibility into the wilderness of
political oblivion. In the absence of a miracle, he no longer has a platform to
reach the public, an opportunity that he seemed to relish.
Even
while this final decision was pending, for the past few weeks there has been a
strange sense of emptiness in reading through South Africa’s Sunday newspapers
and realizing that Malema’s name did not appear. It confirmed the nagging
suspicion that the SA public would miss ‘good ol’ Juju.’
For the past four years, Malema
entertained, puzzled and mesmerized the national audience and he was
“something” to all. Some found his utterances offensive, threatening and
reckless. To them, he was a demagogue.
Others thought of the same Malema as
a charming and inspirational leader, an icon of his generation. They would have
walked to the end of the world with him. He was an admirable and charismatic
folk hero.
Still others were gripped by
Malema’s capability to jolt. He lacked the oratory powers of a Malcolm X or the
humility and disarming intellect of a Julius Nyerere. But with Malema around,
there never was a boring moment. He was
a newsmaker.
Which Malema was real? Which Malema
has been banished from public view? Has there been a case of throwing out the
baby with the dirty water?
The
Great Ideological Divide
While Malema did trigger an ideological split in the ANC, he did not cause it; he merely unveiled it. The divide was there long before Malema and it will be there long after him. The ANC must sooner or later come to grips with that ideological cancer. Otherwise, the possibility exists that Malema could reappear in a different guise. Was Malema’s a case of the proverbial killing of the messenger?
While Malema did trigger an ideological split in the ANC, he did not cause it; he merely unveiled it. The divide was there long before Malema and it will be there long after him. The ANC must sooner or later come to grips with that ideological cancer. Otherwise, the possibility exists that Malema could reappear in a different guise. Was Malema’s a case of the proverbial killing of the messenger?
Post-apartheid black SA remains
horrifically poor in absolute and relative terms. Today, the country indeed has
the dubious distinction of having the widest poor-rich gap in the world. How is
this class lop-sidedness to be rectified? This is where substantive differences
between Malema and his party heavyweights originated.
Championed by Malema for the past
several years, the left believes that an ANC post-apartheid government is
duty-bound to nationalize the means of production such as mines and white-owned
farmlands. By doing so, that government will be in a position to redistribute
the wealth derived thereof and blunt the offensive and politically dangerous
relative inequality of wealth between the races.
Thus, the left rejects the
conventional wisdom that the first order of business is for the government to
sustain national economic growth because it helps to address such social ills
as unemployment and political stability. To them, adhering to such perception
prompts external investments, which are ultimately unwelcome because they
perpetuate crippling foreign dependency.
On that ideological issue Malema was
unable to stomach the party line. Was he trying to tarnish the party or was he
responding to a higher and compelling calling?
Malema
and the SA’s condition
In contemporary SA, the ideas of land confiscation and mine nationalization are simultaneously popular and explosive. They are seductive, firstly, to the extent that they are widely believed (rightly or wrongly) to be intrinsically valid tools to address the issue of general and relative poverty. Secondly, they appeal because they contain a dose of anti-white sentiments. Racial undertones remain a potent component of the country’s politics.
In contemporary SA, the ideas of land confiscation and mine nationalization are simultaneously popular and explosive. They are seductive, firstly, to the extent that they are widely believed (rightly or wrongly) to be intrinsically valid tools to address the issue of general and relative poverty. Secondly, they appeal because they contain a dose of anti-white sentiments. Racial undertones remain a potent component of the country’s politics.
Thirdly COSATU, SA’s largest
federation of unions, laments that the apartheid economy of exploitation
remains intact. COSATU is the powerful partner in the ANC’s government of
tripartite alliance. Will a time come when this vocal mega-labor federation
decides to agitate for the dismantling of the economy as we know it?
Finally, the anti-white wealth
mentality has slowly but surely seeped into the otherwise moderate circles. The
distinguished scholar, Professor Ali Mazrui, has expressed regrets that the
terms to abolish apartheid excluded economic concessions for black SA. As he
has put it, in 1994 the white man said to the Black man, ‘take the crown but we
will keep the gold.’
To mitigate the agony of
‘economic-dream-deferred’, Malema’s ideological dream has been to snatch back
some of the ‘gold.’
Perhaps Malema can be forgiven for
harboring extremist views. He is an
angry young man in a hurry. But the complaint of ‘economic-justice-delayed’ has
recently been echoed by the iconic nemesis to apartheid.
In August 2011, the well-known
Archbishop Desmond Tutu Emeritus, by no means a man of Malema’s ideological
persuasion, raised many eyebrows by calling for imposition of a tax on white
wealth to speed up economic transformation.
In sum, what has been projected as
Malema’s ‘heretical’ revolutionary agenda resonates as ‘conventional’ in the
black SA community. And the same package of ideas has widespread following,
perhaps strong enough to destabilize the country, if push comes to shove.
Hence, the muted concern that the SA current political order would be fertile
ground for an Obama-type politician.
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