By Odimegwu Onwumere
What made the Nigerian Government to be the first from Africa to send in
its soldiers to combat the Malian rebels in a war that started early 2012 when
there was insubordination in the Malian government which spurred rebels to
come-to-light among the Toareg ethnic group in the north and they began a
crusade for self-government, has been an issue of many questions.
The military
junta in Mali
The Federal Government of Nigeria took a decision of sending 1, 200
Nigerian soldiers to Mali this year, what it could not even do during the
crises that ravaged some countries of Africa like Libya, Cote d’Ivoire and
Egypt in the recent past, being the second to France, which had earlier
initiated ground battles with its 1, 400 troops. I60 Nigerian soldiers had so
far arrived Bamako Mali Nigeria had directed a review of Nigeria Abuja
Chief Emeka Anyaoku who was the Chairman of the Advisory Council, had
earlier congratulated President Jonathan in the April 2011 presidential
elections. He termed the elections as “successful, transparent and credible’’,
saying that the elections have made-higher the country’s democratic credentials
in the international community, a statement which President Jonathan gave a
very conspicuous nod to. In a related development, suggestions were offered by
the Council on many areas of national and international interest to Nigeria Nigeria
With the role of Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria was interested in cooperating with Trinidad and Tobago
The role that the
Nigerian government could not play in the Ivorien crisis that followed the
difference-of-opinion in the country’s election of November 28, 2010, is what
it is playing in Mali, even though that the ECOWAS, which resolved to renew
President Jonathan’s tenure as Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of
State and Government till December 31, 2011, resolved in its meeting of
December 7 to accord formal recognition to Alassane Ouattara as President-elect
of Cote d’Ivoire, while urging his rival, Gbagbo, to make a peaceful exit from
power in the best interest of the Ivorien people.
Nigeria being
then the chair state of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government,
the only solution to the Ivorien crisis Jonathan could offer in its Resolution
A/RES.1/03/11 signed by him, was to tell Gbagbo, as armed supporters of the two
men continue to fight one another, that: “The time has come to enforce Decision
of 7 and 24 December 2010 in order to protect life and ensure that transfer of
the reins of power to Alassane Ouattara without further delay.”
In its
extraordinary session in Abuja Cote d’Ivoire
While President Jonathan condemned the widespread violence against
civilians in the Ivorien country, he did not sue for war as thus Mali , but said: “The crisis in Cote d’Ivoire Mali
Federal
Government’s Interest In Mali:
Unlike Egypt and Libya where the Federal Government of Nigeria did not give
a hoot of sending its soldiers to during their crises, and what it could not do
in Cote d’Ivoire, it was doing in Mali. This has gone a long way to put the
statement which says that there is no smoke without fire right. It was, though,
annoying that insurgent groups started fighting the Malian government for the
independence of Northern Mali (Azawad). An Islamist group wanted Azawad as
independent homeland for the Toaregs, having the support of the National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), backed by the Ansar Dine. They
chased the Malian army far away from Azawad, and took control of the place in
April 2012. There was a conception that the dreaded Al-Qaeda terrorist group in
North Africa made the situation got worse by giving its support to a group of
Islamists: Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA).
Earlier, the Federal Government of Nigeria had been looking for solution to
curb the recurrent campaign of violence by the Islamist sect, Boko Haram, in
Nigeria, but especially in the northern part. This took President Jonathan and
his National Security Adviser (NSA), Col. Sambo Dasuki (retd) to Bamako, the
capital of Mali. The two-day working tour which was announced by the
presidential spokesman, Reuben Abati, on Wednesday, October 17, 2012, was for a
secret meeting with the civilian and military authorities in the troubled Mali
and also consult on efforts by ECOWAS and the UN Security Council, to restore
normalcy to that country. But before the tour, investigations revealed that a
tough intelligence report showed that Mali’s northern region was the depot that
was used as the operational base of Boko Haram. The leader of the sect, Sheik
Mohammed Shekau, was also believed to be hiding in Mali and coordinating
attacks on Nigeria.
According to sources, it was noted that one of the meetings in a place like
Niamey was a measly lure. A source said: “The meeting in Niamey was a mere
decoy for President Jonathan to seek collaboration and cooperation of both the
military and civilian authorities in Mali on how best the operational base of
Nigeria’s Boko Haram in the north of Mali, which is under the firm control of
Islamist groups and Tuareg rebels, who took control of the region following a
coup in March... the Nigerian president actually left Niamey, Niger Republic on
Thursday, October 18 and went straight for the main goal of his trip, which is
to hold talks with the Malian authorities, as part of efforts to dismantle the
main structure of Boko Haram in the North of the country (Mali).”
Sources confirmed that in different discussions, part of the discussions
between President Jonathan and Mali’s interim President Traore and Captain
Sanogo were: To stabilise the civilian regime of Traore, mobilise African and
ECOWAS forces to Mali, with a view to flushing out all Islamist groups and
rebels, including Boko Haram leaders that had taken control of North of Mali;
and offered Sanogo a political asylum in Nigeria to pave the way for Traore’s
full control of Mali’s armed forces, which were still loyal to Sanogo. What was
certain to President Jonathan was the success of the war against Boko Haram.
The sources unraveled that the success of the war against Boko Haram depended
largely on the stability in Mali and the knack of the African and the complete
international community to dislocate all rebels and Islamist groups in service
in northern Mali.
Conclusion:
While the Nigerian soldiers had been deployed to Mali, it was not certain
why it took the Federal Government this long to do so, having been notified
that the incessant killings by the Boko Haram in the country were hatched in
Mali. And whether the Federal Government would still reiterate its offer of
asylum to anybody or group in Mali since the war has intensified, was not
clear. It was obvious that Captain Sanogo was only power drunk, but could not
control his arsenal of mutineers. However, it was not certain why Nigeria did
not depend on UN and other world military allies before she deployed her
soldiers to the troubled Mali, as she could not do to countries like Egypt,
Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. In spite of these, President Jonathan could be advised
not to receive any alternative in Mali, when it concerned the security of
Nigeria.
Odimegwu
Onwumere, Poet/Author, Media/Writing
Consultant and Motivator, is the Coordinator, Concerned Non-Indigenes In Rivers
State (CONIRIV); and Founder, Poet Against Child Abuse (PACA), Rivers State,
Nigeria
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